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High Frequency Quotation, Trading, and the Efficiency of Prices  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We examine the relation between high frequency quotation and the behavior of stock prices 
between 2009 and 2011 for the full cross-section of securities in the U.S. On average, higher 
quotation activity is associated with price series that more closely resemble a random walk, and 
significantly lower cost of trading.  We also explore market resiliency during periods of 
exceptionally high low-latency trading: large liquidity drawdowns in which, within the same 
millisecond, trading algorithms systematically sweep large volume across multiple trading 
venues.  Although such large drawdowns incur trading costs, they do not appear to degrade the 
price formation process or increase the subsequent cost of trading.  In an out-of-sample analysis, 
we investigate an exogenous technological change to the trading environment on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange that dramatically reduces latency and allows co-location of servers.  This shock 
also results in prices more closely resembling a random walk, and a sharp decline in the cost of 
trading. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of high frequency trading on market quality is important, and has generated 
strong interest among academics, practitioners and regulators.  Models of the effect of high 
frequency trading on markets generate different predictions, depending on their assumptions and 
their focus.  For example, Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013) build a model in which the ability 
to continuously update order books generates technical arbitrage opportunities and a wasteful 
arms race in which fundamental investors bear costs through larger spreads and thinner markets.  
Similarly, Han, Khapko and Kyle (2014) argue that since fast market makers can cancel quotes 
faster than slow traders, this causes a winner’s curse resulting in higher spreads.  In contrast, in 
Aϊt-Sahalia and Saglam (2013), lower latency generates higher profits and higher liquidity 
provision.  In their model, however, high-frequency liquidity provision declines when market 
volatility increases, which can lead to episodes of market fragility.  In Baruch and Glosten 
(2013), frequent order cancellations are a standard part of liquidity provision, and are generated 
by limit order traders mitigating the risk that their quotes will be undercut (through rapid 
submissions and cancellations).   
There are two strands to the complementary empirical literature.  The first can be broadly 
characterized as examining the behavior of high-frequency traders and estimating their effect on 
markets: researchers use datasets that explicitly identify high frequency traders (by some 
definition), explore the trading strategies they use, test whether those strategies are profitable, 
and whether they impede or improve price discovery.  For example, Brogaard, Hendershott and 
Riordan (2014), Carrion (2013), and Hirschey (2013) all use Nasdaq-identified high frequency 
traders (the so-called “Nasdaq dataset”) and collectively find that HFT are modestly profitable in 
aggregate, that they both demand and supply liquidity, and that they appear to impose some 
adverse selection costs on other traders.  Similarly, Hagströmer and Norden (2013) use data on 
30 stocks from NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm and find evidence which indicates that market-
making HFTs reduce short-term volatility.  The advantage of this first group of studies is that 
identification of high frequency traders is relatively clear-cut.  The disadvantage is that only 
activity on that identifying exchange can be precisely measured.  In a fragmented market like the 
U.S., with substantial variation in access (make-take) fees across exchanges and dark pools, it is 
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entirely possible that HFT behavior in one market (e.g. Nasdaq) may not reflect aggregate 
market behavior, or inform overall market prices.  The latter is our primary concern.
1
   
The second strand of the empirical literature looks at outcomes in a conditional setting: 
identifying changes in market structure that facilitate high frequency activity and examining the 
consequences.  The most important of these papers is Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011), 
which examines 1,082 stocks between December 2002 and July 2003.  Using the start of 
autoquotes on the NYSE as an exogenous instrument, they find that algorithmic trading improves 
liquidity.  More recent studies which examine changes in the trading environment in smaller 
markets draw similar conclusions.  For example, Menkveld (2012) examines the effect of the 
introduction of an electronic exchange (including a large HFT) on trading in a sample of 32 
Dutch stocks, and Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) examine the effect of an upgrade of trading 
systems in 98 stocks on the Deutsche Borse.   
These papers provide evidence on the effects of high frequency trading.   There is very 
little evidence on a critical aspect of current market structure: that of high frequency quoting – 
essentially, the speed of the market environment.  The relative scarcity of this evidence is 
surprising, since many of the theoretical papers in this area describe the speed of changes to the 
supply curve – which is more closely related to quotations than to trades.  And, regulators 
certainly care about high frequency quotations.  Although the SEC’s Concept Release on Equity 
Market Structure (2010) highlights HFT’s as “professional traders acting in a proprietary 
capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis”, the 
concept release also recognizes the importance of high frequency quoting in that it might 
represent “phantom liquidity (which) disappears when most needed by long-term investors”.2  
That is, high frequency quoting generates execution risk, which has welfare consequences and is 
                                                             
1
 For example, suppose one observes trades from a high frequency trader from Exchange X that is known to be 
cheaper for extracting liquidity for a particular group of stocks.  Such a high frequency trader may be providing 
liquidity in Exchange Y, but a researcher only observing trades on Exchange X would erroneously draw the 
conclusion that this high frequency trader is a liquidity extractor.  There are a variety of reasons why there may be a 
non-random distribution of trades across trading venues, ranging from concerns about adverse selection to 
systematic differences in make-take fees.   
2
 Filings with regulatory bodies, exchanges, trade groups and press accounts, as well as some academic papers, 
contain numerous suggestions to slow the pace of quotation and trading to what is determined to be a “reasonable” 
pace.  See, for example, the testimony of the Investment Company Institute to the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, US House of Representatives, in which the testifier argues for meaningful fees on cancelled orders as a 
mechanism to prevent high frequency changes in the supply curve (http://www.ici.org/pdf/12_house_cap_mkts.pdf). 
 3 
an important characteristic of market structure.  For example, Hasbrouck (2013) notes that the 
execution risk caused by high-speed changes in quotes may not be diversifiable, with slower 
traders always losing to faster traders.
3
  Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2014) investigate policy 
approaches, including a Pigovian tax, which may mitigate externalities due to differences in 
traders’ ability to process the amount of information generated by the market, such as the volume 
of high-frequency quotations.  Stiglitz (2014) expresses skepticism that high frequency 
quotation/trading is welfare improving and makes a case for slower markets.   
Our purpose is to provide large sample evidence on the influence of high frequency 
quoting on market quality.  We do not look at the trading strategies of identified high-frequency 
traders; instead, we examine market outcomes.  We conduct two types of tests: (a) unconditional 
tests designed to provide evidence for a comprehensive cross-section of securities over a long 
and relatively recent time series, and (b) conditional tests which measure the effect of high-
frequency traders during different types of market conditions and over changes in market 
structure.  The latter examine both ‘average’ and stressed market environments, and separately, a 
change in trading protocols.  Each of the tests described below either provides new evidence on 
the influence of high-frequency quotations on markets, and/or fills a gap in our understanding of 
high-speed markets.   
Our sample comes from the two largest equity markets in the world: the full cross-section 
of securities in the U.S., and the largest 300 stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The sample 
period is 2009-2011 for the U.S. and 2010-2011 for Japan.  The breadth of the cross-section 
allows for general conclusions and recent data are important since there have been significant 
changes in market structure in the past few decades.  It is also critical that the time-series be long 
enough to generate statistical power, particularly since cross-sectional independence is likely to 
be low. Finally, the Japanese data allow for an out-of-sample test in which we can estimate how 
an exogenous change in the speed of the market changes price discovery and the average cost of 
trading. 
                                                             
3
 Using a sample of 100 stocks in April 2011, Hasbrouck (2013) examines variances over time scales as low as 1 
millisecond, and finds that these short horizon variances appear to be approximately five times larger than those 
attributable to fundamental price variance. 
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Our measure of high frequency quoting, which we refer to as quote updates, is any 
change in the best bid or offer (BBO) quote or size across all quote reporting venues.  Each such 
change can be triggered by the addition of liquidity to the limit order book at the BBO, the 
cancellation of existing unexecuted orders at the BBO, or the extraction of liquidity via a trade.  
Our first test examines the relation between quote updates and variance ratios over short 
horizons.  A benchmark variance ratio of one is consistent with a random walk in prices, which 
is typically associated with weak form market efficiency.
4
  If high frequency activity merely 
adds noise to security prices, then we should observe variance ratios substantially smaller than 
one for securities in which high frequency activity is more prevalent, as high frequency 
quotation-induced price changes are reversed; Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) describe this 
possibility as liquidity-based volatility, which might be observed in short-horizon variance ratio 
tests.  The more quickly reversals occur, the quicker variance ratios should converge to one.  In 
contrast, if high frequency quotations are associated with persistent swings away from 
fundamental values, or slow adjustments to shocks, variance ratios in securities with higher 
levels of quotations may rise above one.   
Between 2009 and 2011, in the smallest size quintile of stocks, there is less than one 
quote update per second.  In large capitalization stocks, on average, changes to the top of the 
limit order book occur every 50 milliseconds.  Controlling for firm size and trading activity, 
average variance ratios (based on 15-second and 5-minute quote midpoint returns) are reliably 
closer to one for stocks with higher updates.  We also examine variance ratios for a subset of 
securities at higher frequencies (100 milliseconds compared to 1- and 2-second returns) and find 
largely similar results.  The time series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
variance ratios is also lower for stocks with higher updates, implying that higher update activity 
is associated with lower variability in deviations from a random walk.     
Higher updates are associated with lower costs of trading.  Again controlling for firm size 
and trading activity, average effective spreads are lower for stocks with higher quote updates by 
0.5 to 6 basis points.  To put this in economic perspective, make or take fees of $0.003 per share 
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 See, e.g., Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) for an excellent discussion of the random walk hypothesis and 
variance ratio tests.   
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for a $60 stock correspond to 0.5 basis points.  Make/take fees are important enough to drive 
differences in (algorithmic) order routing between exchanges, implying that the differences in 
effective spreads that we observe are at least as economically important.   
Effective spreads could narrow because of lower revenue for liquidity providers (lower 
realized spreads) or smaller losses to informed traders (changes in price impact).  Most of the 
difference in effective spreads comes from a reduction in realized spreads, suggesting that 
increased competition between liquidity providers provides incentives to update quotes.  
Regardless of the source, the magnitude of the effect of higher updates on market metrics 
appears to be economically meaningful; increases in the number of updates represent more than 
simply the addition of noisy data which must be processed and filtered out to assess market 
conditions.   In general, these results are consistent with the Baruch and Glosten (2013) argument 
that there is nothing nefarious about high frequency quote updates: the speed of updating may 
have increased but high-speed updates still represent the provision of liquidity and, on average, 
allow for information to be reflected in prices.  
Our second test concerns the fragility of the market.  A common complaint (e.g. Stiglitz 
(2014)) of the current market structure is that it is fragile in that the price of liquidity rises too 
rapidly, or that liquidity disappears entirely, when traders need it most.  Such episodes, as 
exemplified by the Flash Crash and individual security “mini-crashes”, naturally concern market 
participants and regulators.  We investigate fragility (or rather its mirror image, resilience) by 
examining price formation and trading costs surrounding large and extremely rapid drawdowns 
of liquidity.  In fragile markets, such liquidity drawdowns could cause price series to deviate 
from a random walk and future trading costs to rise.  On the other hand, if markets are resilient, 
then high-frequency liquidity providers should continue to supply liquidity following a 
significant positive shock to liquidity demand, and market quality measures in a high-frequency 
environment should not deteriorate after such an event.    
We begin by identifying liquidity sweeps as multiple trades in a security across different 
reporting venues with the same millisecond timestamp.  Such trades are quite common and are 
simultaneous algorithmic sweeps off the top of each venue’s order book, designed to quickly 
extract liquidity.  Indeed, these algorithmic sweeps are often part of successive sweeps that, 
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within short periods of time, extract even larger amounts of liquidity.  We design a simple 
algorithm to aggregate successive sweeps into singular liquidity drawdowns and examine 
drawdowns in which at least 10,000 shares are traded.  Unsurprisingly, both buyer- and seller-
initiated drawdowns incur substantial costs.  The average total effective spread paid by liquidity 
extractors ranges from over 100 basis points in microcap stocks to 17 basis points for securities 
in the largest size quintile.
5
  Drawdowns in securities with higher updates incur lower costs, 
consistent with the idea that updates are correlated with liquidity provision.  In addition, average 
variance ratios estimated in the 300 seconds before and after such events are indistinguishable 
from each other.  We similarly see no evidence that effective spreads increase after large buyer- 
or seller-initiated liquidity drawdowns.  On average, the market appears resilient.   
Of course, quote updates and prices are endogenous and jointly determined, so that the 
cross-sectional tests do not imply causation.  That is, high frequency traders may be more likely 
to participate, and hence we would be more likely to observe heavy quote updating, in more 
liquid securities.  We perform two additional tests that help with identification, while not 
abandoning a large sample approach. 
First, we exploit the daily time series variation in quote updates.  If high-frequency 
traders are drawn to trading in securities which are more liquid and more efficiently priced, then 
lagged reductions in effective spreads and lagged differences in the deviations of variance ratios 
from one should be important determinants of high frequency updating.  However, a reduced-
form vector autoregression shows the opposite result:  particularly in large capitalization 
securities, prior day increases in effective spreads, and prior day increases in the deviation of 
variance ratios from one, are associated with higher updates.  The implication is that a ‘habitat’ 
effect is not driving our cross-sectional results.   
Related, we also find that the daily average number of quote updates closely tracks the 
VIX.  The VAR shows that daily changes in updates are related to lagged innovations in the VIX 
but not vice-versa, implying that update activity is not merely noise but related to economic 
fundamentals.  If quote updates are the tool used by liquidity providers to manage their intraday 
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 In comparison, Madhavan and Cheng (1997) report average price impact (measured as the price movement from 
20 trades prior to a block print) of between 14 and 17 basis points in Dow Jones stocks for 30 days in 1993-1994. 
 7 
risk, it seems unlikely that variance ratios in day t are driving quotation activity in day t-1. The 
implication is that if we use the prior day’s updates to sort stocks into low and high update 
groups, this will mitigate the possibility that an omitted factor is driving both the lagged update 
measure, and current spreads and variance ratios.  Using the previous day’s update measures, we 
continue to find that higher updates are associated with variance ratios closer to one.   
Second, we examine an exogenous technological change to trading practices in the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange.  On January 4, 2010 the Tokyo Stock Exchange replaced its existing trading 
infrastructure with a new system (arrowhead) that reduced the time from order receipt to 
posting/execution from one-to-two seconds to less than 10 milliseconds.  At that time, the TSE 
also permitted co-location services and started reporting data in 100 millisecond increments 
(down from minutes).  This large change in latency provides us with an exogenous shock that 
helps identify the impact of high frequency quoting on the price formation process.  The fact that 
it takes place in a non-U.S. market is advantageous in that it serves an out-of-sample purpose.  
Unsurprisingly, the introduction of arrowhead resulted in large increases in updates.  As with the 
U.S., spikes in updates correspond to economic fundamentals and uncertainty, such as the 
earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan in March 2011.  Unlike the U.S., our Japanese data allows 
us to directly observe new order submissions, cancellations and modifications.  We find 
increases in all three components of updates after the introduction of arrowhead, along with 
similar spikes related to economic shocks.  Most importantly, we find a systematic improvement 
in variance ratios between the three-month period before and after the introduction of arrowhead 
in every part of the trading day.  There are also beneficial effects on the cost of trading: effective 
spreads decline by roughly 10% on the date of the introduction of the new trading system.  
Overall, the data suggest that facilitation of high frequency quotation has, on net, beneficial 
effects in the second largest equity market in the world. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe our sample 
and basic measurement approach.  We discuss the cross-sectional results in Section 3, and 
present alternative tests, including those based on liquidity sweeps and Japanese data in Section 
4.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Sample construction and measurement 
2.1 U.S. data and sample  
For 2009 we use the standard monthly TAQ data in which quotes and trades are time-
stamped to the second.  For 2010 and 2011, we use the daily TAQ data (NBBO and CQ files) in 
which quote and trades contain millisecond timestamps.  There are obvious advantages of 
working with data that have millisecond resolution.  For example, we avoid conflation in signing 
trades, a process necessary for computing effective spreads.  In addition, these data are also 
necessary for identifying liquidity sweeps. 
In processing TAQ data, we remove quotes with mode equal to 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 
20, 27, 28 and trades with correction indicators not equal to 0, 1 or 2.  We also remove sale 
condition codes that are O, Z, B, T, L G, W, J and K, quotes or trades before or after trading 
hours, and locked or crossed quotes.  In the millisecond data, we also employ BBO qualifying 
conditions and symbol suffixes to filter the data.  We use an algorithm provided by WRDS 
(TAQ-CRSP Link Table, Wharton Research Data Service, 2010) that generates a linking table 
between CRSP Permno and TAQ Tickers.  We keep only firms with CRSP share codes 10 or 11 
and exchange codes 1, 2, and 3.  To ensure that small infrequently traded firms do not unduly 
influence our results, we remove firms with a market value of equity less than $100 million or a 
share price less than $1 at the beginning of the month.   
Many of our tests are based on size quintiles because of significant differences between 
small and large capitalization firms.  We employ the prior month’s NYSE size breakpoints from 
Ken French’s website to create quintiles.  Using NYSE breakpoints obviously causes the 
quintiles to have unequal numbers of firms in them, but we end with a better distribution of 
market capitalization across groups.  This method also facilitates comparisons for those 
interested in the relevance of our results for investment performance and portfolios.  On average, 
we sample more than 3,000 stocks which represent over 95% of aggregate U.S. market 
capitalization. 
 
2.2 Japanese data and sample 
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During our sample period, trading on the TSE is organized into a morning session 
between 9:00 am and 11:00 am, and an afternoon session from 12:30 to 3:00 pm.  Each session 
opens and closes with a single price auction (known as “Itayose”), and continuous trading 
(known as “Zaraba”) takes place between the auctions.  Under certain conditions (e.g. trading 
halts), price formation can take place via the Itayose method even during continuous trading. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange provided us with two proprietary datasets.  The first is for the 
six months prior to the introduction of arrowhead (July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009), and the 
second is for 15 months after the introduction of arrowhead (January 4, 2010 to March 31, 2011).  
The data are organized as a stream of messages that allow us to rebuild the limit order book in 
trading time.  Prior to the introduction of arrowhead, time stamps are in minutes but updates to 
the book within each minute are correctly sequenced.  After arrowhead, time stamps are reported 
to us in milliseconds.  For each change to the book, we observe the trading mechanism and the 
status of the book (Itayose, Zaraba, or trading halts).  We also observe the nature of each 
modification to the book: new orders, modifications which do not discard time priority, 
modifications which result in an order moving to the back of the queue, cancellations, executions 
and expirations.  The data also identify special quote conditions and sequential trade quotes.  
Each dataset is for the largest 300 stocks in First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange by 
beginning-of-month market capitalization.  As a result, the sampling of stocks varies slightly 
over time.  Lot sizes for stocks vary cross-sectionally and change over time.  The TSE provided 
us with a separate file that contains lot sizes as well as changes in these sizes, allowing us to 
compute share-weighted statistics. 
 
2.3 Measuring quote updates 
We build our main measure (“quote updates”) as the number of changes that occur in the 
best bid or offer price, or in the quoted sizes at these prices, within a specified time interval for 
all registered exchanges.  We construct this manually for each exchange, rather than relying on 
the official NBBO.  There are several advantages to using this method.  A venue choice is a 
decision element common to both liquidity extraction and provision algorithms.  Venue choices 
are often dynamic in nature and can be changed for different child orders generated from the 
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same parent.  Moreover, under Regulation NMS, flickering quotes, defined as quotes that change 
more than once per second, are not eligible to set the NBBO.
6
  By using the BBO across all 
exchanges, we include quote changes that are legitimate changes to the tip of each exchange’s 
liquidity supply curve, regardless of whether the change is eligible to set a new NBBO.  This is 
an underestimate because it does not include dark venues, and also does not include hidden 
orders.  In addition, it does not consider changes to the totality of the supply curve, that is 
liquidity outside the best bid or ask prices (“Level II” of the quote book).   
Changes in updates occur as orders are added to each exchange’s book, removed from the 
respective books due to cancellation, or removed due to executions.  The first two represent 
changes through quotation activity.  The latter is a change in the tip of the liquidity supply curve 
caused by a prior intersection with a demand curve (i.e. a trade).  Trades, by virtue of their 
capital commitment, have important consequences for the price formation process, impounding 
information into prices and also demanding/supplying liquidity.  We therefore conduct tests 
controlling for trade frequency. 
In Japanese data, we calculate updates in a manner similar to that for the U.S. but without 
the need to deal with venue fragmentation during our sample period.  There is an added 
advantage in that, in addition to updates, we separately observe submissions, modifications, 
cancellations, executions, and expirations.  As we show later, these are highly correlated, 
suggesting that even though updates are the summation of these different behaviors, they are a 
good proxy for cancellations. 
 
2.4 Measuring price efficiency and execution quality 
2.4.1 Variance ratio  
Following the notation in Lo and MacKinlay (1988), define Xt as the log price process, 
where Xt = X0, X1, …, XT.  We refer to the price process in generic terms, although in 
implementation we use NBBO quote midpoints to avoid negative autocorrelation induced by bid-
ask bounce.  For cross-sectional tests, we measure prices/returns over 15 second and 5 minute 
                                                             
6
 Exchanges are free to ignore flickering quotes for trade through protection and many exchanges have rules that 
explicitly prohibit quote manipulation (e.g. NYSE/Arca Rule 5210). 
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intervals, and estimate the ratio of the variance of these returns over measurement intervals of a 
half-hour.  There are 120 15-second returns in a half-hour and we require at least 20 non-zero 15-
second returns, to calculate a variance ratio.  This ensures that variances, and therefore their 
ratios, are not degenerate.  Our choice of measurement interval is determined by two tradeoffs.  
The interval needs to be short enough to measure high frequency changes in the supply curve, 
while preserving time of day effects.  The interval also needs to be long enough to reliably 
measure contemporaneous variance ratios across a large sample of securities.  A half hour 
interval is a reasonable balance between capturing high frequency activity and this econometric 
necessity.
7
 
Given the speed of the quote updating process, it is possible that 15 seconds is too long 
an interval.  In a robustness check, we also measure variance ratios using 100 milliseconds, and 
one or two second returns for stocks in the largest size quintile.  We do so only for large cap 
stocks because in other securities, quote midpoints do not change enough in successive 100 
millisecond intervals to provide a reliable measure of the variance of returns.  In addition, for 
calculating variance ratios around liquidity sweeps, we use the variability of quote midpoints at 1 
and 15 second intervals, in a 300 second period before and after each sweep.   
Each return interval is equally spaced so that there are T = nq returns in the measurement 
interval, where n and q are integers greater than one.
8
  There are T-q+1 overlapping returns in the 
data.  Comparing midpoint sampling intervals, we generally have q = 10 or 20 in our tests (see 
Lo and MacKinlay (1989) for a discussion of the choice of q).  Given this, the estimate of the 
mean drift in prices is  
 ̂  
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so that the variance of shorter interval returns (a) is then  
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 An alternative to traditional variance ratios is to measure pricing errors using a Hasbrouck (1993) VAR model. 
However, such an approach is more appropriate for pricing errors associated with trades, whereas our interest is in 
standing quotes.  In addition, the computational burdens of the Hasbrouck method, particularly in the millisecond 
data environment and for a large cross -section of securities, are considerable. 
8
 Note that n is the number of non-overlapping long-horizon returns in the measurement interval and q represents the 
number of non-overlapping short-horizon intervals that are included in the long-horizon return.   
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To maximize power, we use overlapping q
th
 differences of Xt so that the variance of larger 
interval (c) returns is  
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Lo and MacKinlay (1989) recommend estimating variances as follows with a bias correction. 
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A random walk in the underlying returns implies that variances are linear in the measurement 
interval.  Given the definitions above, this implies that the ratio of  ̅ 
 ( ) to  ̅ 
 ( ), or the ratio of 
scaled large interval returns’ variance to short interval returns’ variance, should be equal to 1.   
Therefore, a test of the random walk hypothesis is  
 
  ( )  
 ̅ 
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 ̅ 
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   = 0 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) show that   ( ) is a linear combination of the first q-1 
autocorrelation coefficients with arithmetically declining weights.   
 
2.4.2 Execution quality 
We estimate effective (percentage) half spreads in standard ways, defined as follows. 
        (       )     
 
where qjt is equal to +1 for buyer-initiated trades and -1 for seller-initiated trades, pjt is the 
transaction price and mjt is the prevailing quote midpoint.  Signing trades in a high frequency 
quoting and trading environment is extremely noisy if timestamps are in seconds.  In calculating 
effective spreads for trades in 2010 and 2011, there is no mis-measurement because we use data 
with millisecond timestamps.  For some tests that include data from 2009, we use the approach 
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advocated by Holden and Jacobsen (2014).  For tests that require absolute precision in 
timestamps (such as identifying liquidity sweeps), we only use data from 2010-2011.  
We also decompose effective spreads into their components: realized spreads and price 
impact.  Realized spread is computed as follows: 
        (          )     
where mj,t+τ is the quote midpoint τ periods after the trade.  The realized spread is a measure of 
revenue to market makers that nets out losses to better-informed traders.  It is conventional in 
prior studies to set τ to 5 minutes after the trade.  The horizon can be thought of as long enough 
to incorporate the permanent impact of the trade so that quotes are subsequently stabilized, and 
temporary effects dissipated.  One can also think of the horizon as one in which liquidity 
providers can close their positions.  Under either view, 5 minutes may be excessively long given 
the speed of quoting and trading in our sample period.  We therefore estimate realized spreads 
from one second to 20 seconds after each trade.  While computationally challenging, this allows 
us to examine the full term-structure of realized spreads.   
We also calculate the losses to better-informed traders, or price impact, as follows. 
        (           )     
Realized spreads and price impact represent a decomposition of effective spreads: the 
identity describing their relationship is exact at particular points in this term structure (values of 
τ), such that esjt = rsjt + pijt. 
 
3. Cross-Sectional results 
3.1 Quotation and trading Aativity 
We calculate the average number of trades and quote updates across securities in a size 
quintile in a half hour interval, and then average over the entire time series.  Panel A of Table 1 
shows the average number of trades per second and Panel B shows the average number of quote 
updates per second.  Given our data filters in section 2.1, each quintile is well diversified across a 
large number of firms.  The smallest size quintile has the largest number of firms due to the use 
of NYSE size breaks, and typically contains micro-cap stocks.  Generally, quintiles 4 and 5 
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contain over 80% of the aggregate market capitalization.  For readers interested in efficiency 
outside of small stocks, focusing on these quintiles is adequate to conduct inferences. 
The average number of trades and quote updates increases monotonically from small to 
large firms.  The magnitude of the increases is notable.  For instance, between 1:00 and 1:30 PM, 
there are 0.03 trades per second (or 54 trades in the half hour) for the smallest market 
capitalization securities.  In contrast, for stocks in the largest size quintile there is almost one 
trade per second.  This velocity of trading increases sharply at the beginning and end of the 
trading day.  In the last half hour of the trading day when liquidity demands are particularly high, 
there are over two trades per second in the stocks in the largest size quintile. 
Panel B shows the number of quote updates.  There are monotonic increases in quote 
updates across size quintiles.  Focusing again on the 1:00 to 1:30 PM window, there are 0.52 
quote updates per second in the smallest size quintile and over 12 quote updates per second in 
the largest size quintile.  In general, the data show that changes to the top of the book are an 
order of magnitude faster than trades – quoting occurs at a much higher frequency than trading.  
The speed of these changes underscores the importance of execution risk and latency.     
 
3.2 Quote updates and variance ratios 
We sort all stocks within a size quintile into low and high update groups in each half hour 
based on the median number of updates in the prior half hour.  We calculate the cross-sectional 
average variance ratio in each half hour and report the time series mean of these cross-sectional 
averages in Table 2.  The standard errors of these means are extremely small because of the 
averaging of variance ratios over large numbers of stocks.  To provide a sense of variability, we 
report time series averages of the cross-sectional standard deviations of variance ratios in 
parentheses. 
Outside of microcap stocks (size quintile 1), average variance ratios are quite close to 
one.  For all intents and purposes, an investor seeking to trade securities in these groups can 
expect prices to behave, on average, as a random walk over the horizons that we examine.  We 
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also calculate (but do not report) first order autocorrelations of 15 second quote midpoint returns.  
These autocorrelations are largely indistinguishable from zero.
9
 
Our interest is in the difference in variance ratios between high and low update groups.  
In the vast majority of cases, variance ratios in the high update groups are closer to one than in 
the low update group.  For example, in the two largest size quintiles, which contain the majority 
of the market capitalization of the U.S. equity markets, average variance ratios are closer to one 
in high update groups for 17 out of 24 half-hour estimates.  In two cases, the average variance 
ratios are identical and there are 5 cases where high update groups have variance ratios which are 
further from one.  Average cross-sectional standard deviations are also systematically lower for 
high update groups.  In the two largest size quintiles, the cross-sectional standard deviation is 
lower for high update groups in all 24 cases.   
 
3.3 Separating quote updates from trades 
Quote updates can come from additions and cancellations of orders to the order book, or 
from trades that extract liquidity.  One could argue that controlling for trading is unnecessary 
because all changes to the supply curve are legitimate, regardless of whether they are due to 
submissions/cancellations or trading.  Nonetheless, it is important to understand whether it is 
differences in the trading frequency across these groups that drive the relationship we observe.  
Within each size quintile, we sort all stocks in a half hour interval into quintiles based on the 
number of trades in that interval.  Then, within each trade quintile, we further separate stocks 
into low and high update groups based on the median number of quote updates in the prior half 
hour.  This dependent sort procedure results in 50 groups (5x5x2), and allows us to see the effect 
of increased quotation activity, holding size and trading activity roughly constant.   
Displaying such a large number of estimates is an expositional challenge so we employ 
two approaches to describe our results.  Figure 1 shows average variance ratios for each size and 
trade quintile, with separate bars for low and high update groups.  The graph shows that across 
all size and trade quintiles, average variance ratios are generally closer to one for high update 
                                                             
9
 We also calculate but do not report variance ratios and autocorrelations based on transaction prices.  As expected, 
they are influenced by bid-ask bounce. 
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groups.  Figure 2 shows a similarly constructed bar graph for the average cross-sectional 
standard deviation of variance ratios.  Cross-sectional standard deviations are systematically 
lower for high update groups in every size and trade quintile.   
Table 3 contains formal statistics for these differences.  Since our interest is in departures 
of variance ratios from one, we calculate the absolute value of the difference in each stock’s 
variance ratio from one (|VRi-1|), and then compute cross-sectional averages for low and high 
update groups.  We then calculate the difference in cross-sectional averages (high minus low) 
and report time series means of these differences in Panel A.  The average differences in the 
distance of variance ratios from one are negative for every size and trade quintile, indicating that 
high update groups consistently have variance ratios which are closer to one.  The magnitudes of 
the differences are between 0.02 and 0.03, which are sizeable given the average variance ratios in 
Table 2.  Standard errors, which are conservative and based on the time series distribution of 
differences, are quite small. 
It may be that 15 seconds is too long an interval for the purpose at hand.  Therefore, we 
also measure variance ratios by sampling quote midpoints at 100 millisecond and 1 second 
intervals (q=10), as well as 100 millisecond and 2 second (q=20) intervals.  This is only feasible 
for large stocks because quote midpoints have to change enough over 100 milliseconds to 
calculate variances.  As in our previous tests, we calculate average variance ratios across trade 
quintiles, and then report differences in the high versus low update groups in Panel B of Table 3.  
In trade quintile 1, the differences in variance ratios are statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
In trade quintiles 2 through 4, the differences are reliably negative, implying that high update 
groups have variance ratios closer to one even at this higher frequency.  In trade quintile 5, the 
difference in average variance ratios is positive when sampling midpoints at 1 second but 
indistinguishable from zero when using 2 seconds where the test has more power.  Thus, even at 
horizons measured in fractions of a second, high frequency quoting seems to be positively 
associated with price series that are closer to a random walk. 
 
3.4 Effective spreads 
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To calculate average effective spreads across update groups, we first calculate share-
weighted effective spreads for each stock in a half hour interval, and then average across stocks 
in a group.  These results are presented in Figure 3 and Panel C of Table 3.  In every size and 
trade quintile, the differences are negative; effective spreads are lower for high update quintiles.  
With the exception of the smallest trade quintile in microcap stocks, all of the reported 
differences across groups have small standard errors.  The magnitude of the differences varies 
across size and trade quintiles, ranging from 0.06 to 6.10 basis points.  In large cap stocks (size 
quintile 5) and the highest trade quintile, the difference in effective spreads is 1.12 basis points.  
We can assess economic significance either by considering the relative magnitude of quoted 
spreads or comparing the differences in effective spreads to access fees.  Quoted spreads for 
large cap stocks vary from 2 to 10 basis points over our sample period.  Access fees of $0.003 
for an average stock price of $60 amount to 0.5 basis points.  By either measure, the differences 
in effective spreads that we observe across low- and high-update groups appear to be 
economically large. 
We also estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions for each half hour, where variance ratios 
and effective spreads are dependent variables, and market capitalization, price levels and various 
measures of trading activity are independent variables.  Time series plots of regression slopes 
(not reported) show largely the same result as the results in Table 3: securities with higher levels 
of quotation activity tend to have price processes that more closely resemble random walks and 
lower effective spreads. 
 
3.4.1 Spread decompositions 
Reduction in effective spreads could come from changes in realized spreads to liquidity 
providers, changes in losses to informed trades (i.e. a change in price impact), or some 
combination of the two.  Changes in price impact could occur either because of a change in the 
information environment, or because liquidity providers are less likely to be adversely selected.  
Realized spreads could decline because of competition between liquidity providers, which seems 
plausible given the investment in infrastructure and trading technology.  We calculate effective 
and realized spreads over one second intervals ranging from one to 20 seconds--effectively a full 
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term structure of the spread decomposition over this horizon.  With realized spreads in place, 
price impact over each horizon is simply the difference between effective spreads and realized 
spreads (pijt = esjt - rsjt). 
Implementing this approach in millisecond data is computationally non-trivial because of 
the enormous volume of within-second quotes.  Because full cross-sectional coverage is 
important to our tests, we sample the time series by randomly selecting two days in each month 
for 2010-2011.  For these 48 days, we calculate share-weighted effective spreads, realized 
spreads and price impact for each stock, and then average across low and high update groups 
within size and trade quintiles.  As in Table 3, we calculate differences between each of these 
measures by subtracting the low update group average from its high update group counterpart.  
Table 4 shows the time series of average differences in basis points.  To conserve space, we only 
show realized spreads and price impact for one, five, ten and twenty seconds. 
Consistent with the full sample results in Table 3, average differences in effective half 
spreads are negative for most size and trade quintiles.
10
  In size quintiles 1 through 3, most of the 
reduction in effective spreads comes from decreases in realized spreads.  In size quintiles 4 and 
5, the reductions in effective spreads themselves are smaller, but are still due to declines in 
realized spreads.  These results are in contrast to those reported by Hendershott et al. (2011) who 
report increases in realized spreads between 2001-2005, suggesting that liquidity providers (at 
least temporarily) earned greater revenues after the advent of autoquoting.  The decline in 
realized spreads that we find also differs from the results in Riordan and Storkenmaier (2011), 
who find a sharp and persistent increase in realized spreads following a system upgrade on 
Deutsche Borse that resulted in a decline in latency.  Our results suggest that between 2009 and 
2011, competition between electronic liquidity providers appears to be sufficient to generate 
reductions in realized spreads for those securities with a higher-speed trading environment.   
 
3.5 Liquidity drawdowns and market resiliency 
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 The effective spreads calculated from millisecond data are less variable than the effective spreads in Table 3, 
which includes both the second data (2009) and the millisecond data (2010-2011).  We conjecture that the higher 
variability is a result of noise in signing trades when non-millisecond data are used.  To test this, we repeated our 
tests in Table 3 using only 2010-2011 millisecond data and find that standard errors are much smaller.  The general 
pattern of differences in effective spreads between high and low update groups remains similar. 
 19 
In resilient markets, large drawdowns of liquidity should minimally influence the future 
supply of liquidity.  The millisecond TAQ data afford the possibility of such a test.
11
  We employ 
a three-step procedure to isolate large liquidity drawdowns.  We first identify multiple trades in a 
stock with the same millisecond timestamp across more than one reporting venue (“sweeps”).  
We then aggregate individual sweeps that occur within short durations of each other into 
“collapsed” sweeps, and focus exclusively on those that extract large amounts of liquidity.  
Details of the process are described below. 
In the first step, we isolate multiple trades with the same millisecond time stamp that 
originate from different reporting venues.  It is critical that trades take place in different venues 
to ensure that multiple trades with the same millisecond time stamp are not a mechanical artifact 
of trade reporting and splitting procedures – as would be generated by one large order interacting 
with multiple small counterparty orders on a single limit order book.  Trades across multiple 
venues in the same millisecond are algorithmic in nature, sweeping the top of various order 
books in dark and/or lit markets, and represent attempts to rapidly extract liquidity.  During our 
sample period, there are 764 million such liquidity sweeps, comprising $17.6 trillion in volume.  
In small stocks, sweeps represent 13% of total volume, rising almost monotonically to 
22% for large stocks.  Given fragmentation and the speed at which quotes change, trading 
algorithms that attempt to extract liquidity quickly across multiple venues must exercise 
particular care to not violate the trade-through rule of Regulation NMS.  We observe 
considerable use of Intermarket Sweep Orders (ISOs) in algorithmic sweeps, and although not 
reported, the data show an increase in the size of sweeps and the use of ISOs over time.   
We separate the sample of sweeps into buyer- and seller-initiated sweeps, so that the 
trading we analyze represents rapid drawdowns on either the bid or ask side of the limit order 
book (and not just fast random trades on both sides of the market).  The median time difference 
between successive sweeps in small cap stocks is 22 seconds, falling monotonically across size 
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 One could look, ex post, at cases in which there are dramatic changes in price seemingly caused by innocuously 
small trades.  This is the approach that some market participants take to highligh t aspects of market structure to 
either regulators or the press.  A good example is individual stock “flash crashes” systematically documented by 
Nanex on its website (http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrashEquities/FlashCrashAnalysis_Equities.html).  We believe 
that our method provides results that are more representative of the conditions faced by market participants in a 
large cross-section of securities.  In particular, our method does not require cherry-picking the data on price changes 
or measures of market quality, allowing for general inferences .  
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quintiles to only 0.8 seconds in large cap stocks.  It is unlikely that sweeps on one side of the 
market, which occur so closely to one another, are independent.  Typical trading algorithms 
generate waves of child orders that are conditioned on prior executions and desired volume 
(among other parameters).  Therefore, the second step of the procedure we use aggregates 
closely timed sequential sweeps.  To do so, we first calculate the expected time between trades as 
the median time between trades for each stock-half-hour in the prior month.  We then cumulate 
consecutive buy or sell sweeps together if the time between adjacent sweeps is less than its 
expected value.  A graphical illustration of this process is provided in Figure 4. 
By construction, aggregated sweeps are larger and inter-sweep time differences are 
greater.  To focus on large liquidity demands, we further restrict the sample to aggregated 
sweeps that cumulatively extract 10,000 shares.  There are two reasons to impose this restriction.  
First, it corresponds to the cutoff for block trades in the upstairs market in the era of pre-
electronic trading.  Second, it allows for comparisons with the extensive literature on the 
liquidity and price discovery effects of such block trades.  The final sample consists of about 4.4 
million aggregated sweeps.  The average time between successive aggregated sweeps ranges 
from 2,456 seconds for size quintile 1 to 454 seconds for size quintile 5.
12
   
Our interest is in the extent to which the market is able to absorb such liquidity shocks 
without experiencing significant changes in the price formation process.  To that end, we 
estimate variance ratios before and after these large liquidity sweeps.  This poses implementation 
challenges.  We need an appropriate time horizon over which to measure returns.  To preserve 
independence, the pre- and post- measurement interval needs to be short enough so that there is 
minimal overlap in successive sweeps in the same stock.  Given this consideration, and the 
distribution of the time differences between consecutive sweeps, we define pre- and post-sweep 
periods as 300 seconds.  Pre-sweep periods include all observations up to the beginning of the 
sweep and post-sweep observations commence immediately after the end of the sweep.  For 
measuring variance ratios, this allows us to sample quote midpoints at 1 second and 15 second 
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 We also identify large sweeps using a stock specific approach.  We compute a relative volume ratio as  the number 
of shares traded in the collapsed sweep, scaled by the product of average trade size (in shares) in the prior month 
multiplied and the number of trades.  We then consider large sweeps as those above the 95
th
 percentile in the 
distribution of this relative volume ratio.  Such a definition includes many liquidity sweeps that are smaller than 
10,000 shares. 
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intervals (q=15).  We impose the additional constraint that there be at least 15 non-zero returns in 
each 300 second interval in order to calculate variance ratios. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows average values of |VRt-1| before and after large liquidity 
sweeps.  Average pre- and post-sweep estimates of variance ratios are quite different from one, 
and from the unconditional averages in Table 2.  The relatively high variance over short horizons 
implied by these variance ratios is consistent with the “liquidity-based volatility” that 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2010) describe.   However, it is also related to a more subtle aspect 
of our short-horizon variance ratio measure.  Recall that variances can only be computed if quote 
midpoints move enough (i.e. that the variance measure in returns is non-degenerate), and that we 
require at least 15 non-zero returns to calculate variance ratios.  In our sample, quote midpoints 
exhibit very little movement at the 1- and 15-second horizon in the 300 second interval 
before/after an aggregated sweep.  For example, even in large cap stocks, we are only able to 
reliably calculate variance ratios for 31% of the sample.  That is, the short-horizon variance 
measures used in our calculation of variance ratios around sweeps are biased towards larger price 
movements – and the relative magnitude of the bias increases for shorter horizons.  This implies 
that our variance ratio measures are biased downwards. 
With that in mind, our interest is primarily in changes in variance ratios around the 
liquidity drawdown.  Panel A shows that the values of ∆|VRt-1| are very close to zero.   
Unsurprisingly given the large sample sizes, paired t-statistics reject the null that ∆|VRt-1| is 
different from zero.  However, the direction of the change in point estimates consistently show 
that variance ratios improve slightly (rather than worsen) after large drawdowns in liquidity. 
Panel B shows share-weighted average effective spreads in the 300 seconds before and 
after these large sweeps.  We also report the total effective spread paid by all trades within the 
sweep itself.  Effective spreads before sweeps decline with firm size from roughly 20 basis 
points to 3 basis points.  The average total effective spread, paid by those executing the sweep 
orders, ranges from around 120 basis points (in size quintile 1) to 17 basis points (for quintile 5).  
The latter is roughly similar in magnitude to the total price of block trades in Dow Jones stocks 
reported by Madhavan and Cheng (1997).  Post-sweep effective spreads are quite similar to those 
prior to the liquidity drawdown.  Again, paired t-statistics reject the null of equality and, in all 
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cases, the direction of the difference is one in which effective spreads are lower after the 
liquidity event.  It appears that investors are able to extract large amounts of liquidity from the 
market, with markets replenishing that liquidity quickly and the price discovery process 
experiencing no significant ill effects.
13
 
Changes in the price process and/or trading costs before and after sweeps may be 
fundamentally different for stocks with low versus high quote updates.  Therefore, we also 
calculate changes in variance ratios and effective spreads before, during, and after sweeps after 
placing each sweep into the triple sorted size-trade-update groupings used in Table 3.  The 
changes in variance ratios and effective spreads are small and negative, similar to those in Table 
5 (and therefore not reported in a separate table).  There is, however, one key difference.  Intra-
sweep effective spreads (i.e. the cost of the liquidity drawdown) are significantly higher in 
groups with fewer updates in the prior half hour, with differences ranging in value from 7 to 37 
basis points.  The implication, consistent with the cross-sectional results in Table 3, is that update 
activity is associated with lower trading costs. 
 
4. Alternative tests 
The cross-sectional tests suggest that increased quotation activity is associated with 
variance ratios closer to one and with lower costs of trading. Of course, price efficiency, 
quotation activity and trading are all endogenous.  Although we measure quotation activity prior 
to measuring variance ratios, this endogeneity may affect inferences.  In this section, we report 
results from tests that allow for causal interpretations. 
 
4.1 Exploiting time series variation in updates 
Nagel (2012) reports that returns to supplying liquidity are strongly related to measures 
of fundamental volatility, such as VIX.  If quote updates are the tool that market makers use to 
manage their intraday risk exposure (as well as the returns that they earn), then updates should 
also be related to the VIX.  We sum the number of updates for each firm-day and then average 
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 One might be concerned that requiring data before and after a sweep might introduce a selection bias if sweeps 
cause a significant decline in liquidity.  In that situation, market data would be available before a sweep but not 
after.  We verify that this does not occur in our sample. 
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across firms in a size quintile.  Figure 5 plots the daily time series, along with the VIX over the 
sample period.  The graph shows that the time series variation in updates is large, and the 
correlation of updates with the VIX is clear.  For example, the high volatility period in August 
2011 is accompanied by large increases in updates.  The local peak in the average number of 
updates across all firms and VIX on August 8 coincides with a 6.7% drop in the S&P 500.  This 
suggests that aggregate uncertainty has a role to play in the intensity of changes in the liquidity 
supply curve.   
We investigate these relations more formally using a simple reduced form vector 
autoregression of the following form: 
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where all changes are in percentages and MQ refers to a measure of market quality.  The system 
is estimated on daily data from 2009-2011 separately for each size quintile.  Simple specification 
checks (not reported) show that four lags are adequate to capture the dependence structure.   
Table 6 reports coefficients with Z-statistics in parentheses.  In Panel A, market quality 
(MQ) is measured using the deviations in variance ratios from one (∆|VR-1|), while in Panel B, 
market quality is measured using effective spreads.  We draw two inferences from these 
regressions.  First, we examine the time-series relation between measures of market quality and 
changes in updates.  Consider the possibility that, rather than increases in updates driving 
increases in liquidity and improvements in price discovery, the causation is reversed:  high-
frequency traders increase their activity in securities because those securities are relatively more 
liquid and their prices are relatively more efficient.  Such a relation may occur because it is 
easier for HFT to manage risk in such an environment.  In that case, one would expect changes in 
updates in period t to be negatively related to lagged changes in measures of market quality.  In 
quintiles 1-4, most of the coefficients on lagged values of ∆MQ are statistically indistinguishable 
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from zero in both Panels.  In quintile 5, the coefficients on ∆MQ are positive and, particularly for 
variance ratios measures, statistically significant.  That is, if lagged effective spreads are higher, 
and lagged variance ratios are further from one, high frequency activity increases. This result is 
more consistent with high-frequency traders stepping in to provide liquidity and facilitate price 
discovery, rather than being attracted to improvements in liquidity and efficient pricing.    
The second inference that we draw from these results is that changes in updates are 
positively related to lagged innovations in VIX.  The econometric interpretation is that changes 
in VIX Granger-cause changes in updates.  The economic interpretation is that liquidity suppliers 
react to changes in the risk environment by changing the frequency of updates.  Beyond a one-
day lag, the influence of VIX wanes quite quickly.  Interestingly, the VIX equation shows that 
changes in quote update activity do not Granger-cause changes in the VIX at any lag.  This is 
inconsistent with the belief that high frequency quoting/trading either generates or exacerbates 
measures of market volatility. 
The results of the VAR suggest another test that may help control for endogeneity.  
Despite the fact that we measure variance ratios after calculating quote updates, and the positive 
sign on market quality measures in the update equation above, it still may be the case that 
improvements in variance ratios attract quote updates rather than be caused by them; 
alternatively, another variable, such as the management of inventory risk, could be driving both 
variance ratios and quote updates on day t.  As a control for these potential omitted variables, we 
employ quote updates from the prior day in assigning securities to update groups – it seems 
unlikely  that high-frequency variance ratios in day t affect, or are driven by the variables that 
cause, quotation activity in day t-1.
14
  Since the results in Table 6 indicate that changes in 
updates are negatively related to their lagged values, this allows for still larger separation 
between the two.  We replicate the tests in Tables 2 and 3 using quote update groups assigned 
from the prior day.
15
  The results are not reported in tables to conserve space but they lead to the 
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  Inventory positions may affect both quotation activity and variance ratios.  If that were the case, however, using 
the previous day’s updates to rank stocks should mitigate this effect – HFT’s by definition attempt to end a day’s 
trading with a zero inventory position.  Related, evidence presented in Hendershott and Menkveld (2013) suggests 
that the average inventory half-life for NYSE securities, measured in a sample period prior to the widespread use of 
high-frequency trading, is relatively short (0.92 days).   
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 We check composition of low and high update groups using both the prior half hour and the prio r day.  On 
average, in about 25% of data, securities fall into different groups based on the different grouping procedures. 
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same conclusion – higher levels of quote updates are associated with variance ratios closer to 
one.   
 
4.2 An out-of-sample exogenous shock: The introduction of arrowhead on the TSE 
4.2.1 Changes to trading protocols 
On January 4, 2010, the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed its trading infrastructure 
(hardware, operating system and software) in a way that facilitates high frequency quoting and 
trading.  Under the prior system, the time between order submission and posting on the book 
and/or execution ranged between 1 to 2 seconds.  In the new system, referred to as arrowhead, 
latency dropped to roughly 2 milliseconds.  This infrastructure change was accompanied by 
several other changes, some of which have a bearing on the design of our tests.  First, the TSE 
permitted co-location services for the cash equities market so that trading firms were permitted to 
install servers on the TSE Primary Site for arrowhead.  Second, time stamps for data reported in 
the public data feed changed from minutes to 100 milliseconds increments.  In July 2012, this 
reporting was further reduced to millisecond increments.  The data provided to us, however, 
contain true millisecond timestamps for the entire post-arrowhead period.  Third, the TSE 
changed its tick size grid.  Pre-arrowhead, stocks were bracketed into 9 price buckets with 
separate tick sizes.  Post-arrowhead, both the breakpoints and the minimum price variation were 
changed.  For example, pre-arrowhead, stocks between ¥30M and ¥50M had a tick size of 
¥100,000.  After arrowhead, this tick size was reduced to ¥50,000.  Importantly, tick size 
reductions did not take place in all stocks/price grids.  Fourth, the TSE instituted a new rule, 
termed the “sequential trade quote” in which a single order that moves prices beyond a certain 
price band (twice the “special quote renewal price interval”) triggers a quote/trade condition for 
one minute.  This condition is designed to inform market participants and attract contra-side 
orders.
16
  Fifth, the TSE implemented changes to procedures which had been designed to slow 
down trading in the event of an order imbalance.  Pre-arrowhead, the TSE employed price limits 
to trigger special price quote dissemination that would (presumably) attract contra order flow.  
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 These conditions are triggered minimally in our sample period.  We reproduce our estimates after removing such 
quotes and find no difference in results. 
 26 
At the introduction of arrowhead, these price limits were raised (allowing prices to move more 
freely), and the allowable range of the next price (the “renewal price interval”) was also raised.  
These changes were not across the board but were based on stock price levels. 
 
4.2.2 Results 
We calculate the average daily number of updates, new order submissions, trades, 
cancellations, modifications to orders that lose time priority, and modifications to orders that 
retain time priority.  The time series of these cross-sectional averages are displayed in Figure 6.  
Recall that in the U.S., we do not observe submissions, cancellations and modifications, and can 
only calculate total updates.  In Japan, the correlation between updates and submissions, trades, 
cancellations and modifications is easily observable, suggesting that in the U.S. as well, updates 
are a good instrument for the rapid supply curve changes in which we are interested.  The spikes 
in the graph correspond to economic uncertainty.  For instance, there is a local spike in updates 
and their constituents on May 7, 2010, the calendar day after the Flash Crash in the U.S. (recall 
that the time difference between NY and Tokyo is 14 hours).  There is a sharp increase in 
updates and their components on the Monday after the earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in March 2011.  Finally, there is a shift in update levels before and after the 
introduction of arrowhead.  As a formal test, we compute the average number of updates for each 
security in a three month interval before and after the arrowhead introduction.  The average 
percentage increase in updates is 18% with a paired t-statistic of 10.75.   
Our interest is in whether the shift to systems designed to accommodate high frequency 
activity is associated with changes in variance ratios and the cost of trading.  To be consistent 
with our U.S. analysis, we continue to calculate variance ratios based on 15 second and 5 minute 
returns.  In the pre-arrowhead data, time-stamps are at the minute frequency.  However, since the 
sequence of changes to the limit order book is preserved in the data series, we use linear 
interpolation to calculate prices changes at 15 second intervals (similar to the process used by 
Holden and Jacobsen (2014) for U.S. markets).  Because Figure 6 suggests substantial changes in 
the information environment over long periods, and because we wish to focus purely on the 
effects of the arrowhead introduction, we calculate variance ratios in the three month interval 
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before and after the introduction.  We isolate securities that do not experience a change in tick 
size so that autocorrelations (and hence variance ratios) are not affected by changes in minimum 
price variation.  To do so, we calculate the minimum and maximum price level for each security 
in the before and after window.  We then identify securities that ex post remained in the same 
tick size price grid.  For such paired comparisons, the sample consists of 229 securities. 
For each security, we calculate the deviation in variance ratios from one (|VR-1|) and 
average over the three month pre- or post-arrowhead period for each half-hour of trading.  We 
then compute paired differences between the pre- and post-period averages for each security.  
The second column of Table 7 shows the cross-sectional average of these paired differences, 
along with their t-statistics.  In every half-hour of the trading day, the change in the deviations of 
variance ratios from one is negative, implying an improvement in variance ratios.  The 
magnitude of the changes in average variance ratios ranges from 0.01 to 0.03, similar to the 
differences between high update and low update groups in the U.S. (Table 3). 
We also calculate share-weighted effective spreads for each stock, again restricting the 
sample to securities with no changes in tick size.  Average paired changes in effective spreads 
are in the 3
rd
 column of Table 7.  In each half hour interval, effective spreads decline by 
approximately 1 and 2 basis points.  The largest decline is in the first half hour in the afternoon 
trading session, at 2.69 basis points.  All changes are highly statistically significant.  Since pre-
arrowhead effective spreads are approximately 10 basis points, a decline of between one to two 
basis points is economically large.   
The 4
th
 and 5
th
 columns of the table show changes in realized spreads and price impact 
based on midpoints 10 second after a trade.
17
  The results show a substantial decline in the 
realized spread, varying from 5 to almost 9 basis points, and an increase in price impact, varying 
from 4 to approximately 8 basis points.  Figure 7 shows that the changes occur sharply at the 
introduction of arrowhead.  Recall that the relation between effective spreads, realized spreads 
and price impact is mechanical: if effective spreads decline by about 1-2 basis points and 
realized spreads decline by a larger amount, it must be the case that price impact increases.   
                                                             
17
 As with U.S. data, we compute realized spreads and price impact using a variety of horizons but only show one 
horizon (10 seconds) for brevity. 
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The increase in price impact associated in this market is not consistent with the decline in 
price impact after autoquote in the U.S. market, observed in Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld 
(2011).  We speculate that this difference is related to different rules on price continuity in the 
two markets.  As described earlier, prior to arrowhead, the TSE’s trading protocols smoothed 
price paths when an order imbalance occurred – in effect, changes in spread midpoints were 
suppressed, reducing measured price impacts.  Post-arrowhead, the magnitude of the smoothing 
is substantially reduced, which would present itself as an increase in price impact.    To test this 
conjecture, we calculate the frequency of special price quote dissemination before and after the 
introduction of arrowhead.  We do so for each stock in the three-month interval before and after 
arrowhead and find that special quote dissemination decreases by an average of 50% (t-
statistic=12.72) following arrowhead introduction.  To further test whether differences in special 
quote dissemination influence the measures of price impact, we separate all stocks (without tick 
size changes) into two groups based on whether the percentage increase in special quote 
dissemination is above or below the median.  In each half hour interval, the increase in price 
impact following the introduction of arrowhead is significantly higher (by between 1-2 basis 
points) for stocks which experienced a larger decline in special quote dissemination following 
arrowhead. 
Summarizing, the introduction of arrowhead trading was designed to reduce the latency 
of trading on the TSE.  Following its introduction, variance ratios move closer to 1.  The 
magnitude of this change is very similar to the difference in variance ratios observed in high 
update and low update groups in the U.S.  Effective spreads also decline sharply immediately 
around the shift to arrowhead, with the magnitude of this decline roughly similar to the 
difference in effective spreads in high and low update groups in the U.S.  Overall, the exogenous 
change in trading platforms in Japan confirms the evidence from U.S. equity markets, that higher 
levels of high frequency activity are associated with improvements in the price discovery process 
and lower costs of trading. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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Market structure in the U.S has undergone a fundamental shift, replacing old-style market 
makers who had affirmative and negative obligations with intermediaries who provide liquidity 
endogenously, electronically, and at higher frequency.  The U.S. is not unique in experiencing 
this shift, as markets around the world have similarly transformed themselves.  The switch to 
high frequency quoting and high frequency trading has generated much debate with many 
researchers, market professionals, and regulators concerned that execution costs or execution 
risks may increase and that price discovery and efficiency has been, or may be, harmed. 
The evidence suggests that, on average, high frequency quotation activity does not 
damage market quality.  In fact, the presence of high frequency quotes is associated with 
improvements in the efficiency of the price discovery process and reductions in the cost of 
trading.  Even when high frequency trading is associated with large extractions of liquidity in 
individual securities, the price process in those securities appears to be quite resilient.  
To us, the data broadly show that the electronic trading market place is liquid and, on 
average, serves investors well.  Some caution is warranted.  Although the evidence suggests that 
high frequency activity is associated with some improvements in the market’s function, the 
results do not imply that the market always functions in this way.  An obvious case in point is the 
Flash Crash.  Practitioners also refer to “mini-crashes” in individual securities in which there are 
substantial increases or decreases in prices as liquidity disappears and market orders result in 
dramatic price changes.  While dislocations are harmful to market integrity, it is important to 
recognize that some discontinuities have always occurred in markets (even before the age of 
electronic trading), just as flickering quotes have existed well before the advent of high 
frequency quotation.  If liquidity provision is not mandated by law, liquidity providers can 
always exit without notice, exposing marketable orders to price risk.  Designated Market Maker 
contracts are one way to mitigate this, as in Stockholm, Paris and other exchanges around the 
world (including the NYSE).  These contracts generally do not focus on preventing dislocations 
but can still be potentially beneficial.  Indeed, Bessembinder, Hao and Zheng (2013) argue that 
affirmative obligations of market makers can improve social welfare relative to endogenous 
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liquidity provision.
18
  From an economic perspective, one key issue is whether markets provide 
efficient price discovery on average and whether, in expectation, investors can hope to get fair 
prices.  That appears to be the case in our sample.  Of course, it is also important to consider 
whether a particular market structure increases or decreases the propensity for dislocations to 
occur, as well as how it affects the severity of the dislocation.  The effects of recent regulatory 
changes to the market structure on market volatility, and the propensity of dislocations to occur, 
is the subject of our current research. 
Caution is also warranted given potential externalities that we cannot measure.  There is a 
tradeoff between the cost and benefit of monitoring high frequency quotation activity (Foucault, 
Roëll and Sandas (2003), and Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2012)).  If liquidity suppliers change 
supply curves in microseconds and liquidity extractors bear the cost of monitoring supply curves, 
this can have a negative effect on welfare.  We provide no evidence on the extent to which high 
frequency quotation/trading affects welfare.  However, understanding the influence of rapidly 
changing supply curves on price formation and the cost of trading is nevertheless important 
because as Stiglitz (2014) points out, these are ‘intermediate’ variables that are necessary 
(although not sufficient) for understanding the role of high frequency quoting/trading on welfare.  
 
                                                             
18
 The Brady Report (1988) notes that on October 19, 1987, 26% of specialists did not take counterbalancing trades, 
and their trading reinforced market trends in 31 stocks on which detailed data were available.  Some specialists in 
large capitalization securities were in fact short those stocks on that day.  On Tuesday, October 20, 1987, trading of 
39% of specialists in those 31 securities reinforced (negative) market trends.   
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Table 1 
 
Average number of trades and quote updates in size quintiles 
The sample consists of all common stocks (not including ETFs), with a stock price greater than $1 and a market capitalization 
greater than $100m at the beginning of the month.  The sample period is 2009-2011, excluding May 6, 2010.  Each firm is 
placed in a size quintile at the beginning of the month using NYSE breakpoints taken from Ken French’s website.  A quote 
update is defined as any change in the prevailing best bid or offer price (BBO), or any change in the displayed size (depth) for 
the best bid or offer, across all exchanges.  For each firm and half hour interval, we calculate the total number of trades and the 
total number of quote price or quote size changes in that interval.  These are averaged across firms in a quintile and then 
averaged over the time series.   
Size 
9:30 
10:00 
10:00 
10:30 
10:30 
11:00 
11:00 
11:30 
11:30 
12:00 
12:00 
12:30 
12:30 
1:00 
1:00 
1:30 
1:30 
2:00 
2:00 
2:30 
2:30 
3:00 
3:00 
3:30 
3:30 
4:00 
Panel A: Average number of trades per second 
Small 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 
2 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.28 
3 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.60 
4 0.65 0.62 0.50 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.56 1.06 
Large 2.05 1.77 1.41 1.22 1.05 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.90 1.05 1.14 1.42 2.62 
Panel B: Average number of quote updates per second 
Small 1.42 0.98 0.79 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.70 1.09 
2 3.57 2.85 2.33 2.04 1.79 1.60 1.48 1.49 1.55 1.78 1.82 2.13 3.27 
3 6.49 5.82 4.82 4.21 3.64 3.23 3.00 3.04 3.17 3.72 3.81 4.51 6.85 
4 10.81 10.79 9.08 7.92 6.70 5.84 5.42 5.49 5.72 6.70 6.99 8.28 12.42 
Large 25.52 26.02 21.80 18.80 15.93 13.76 12.69 12.87 13.27 15.45 16.18 19.00 27.55 
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Table 2 
 
Average variance ratios for size quintiles 
The sample consists of all common stocks, with a stock price greater than $1 and a market capitalization greater than $100m 
at the beginning of the month from 2009-2011, excluding May 6, 2010.  A quote update is defined as any change in the 
prevailing best bid or offer price (BBO), or any change in the displayed size (depth) for the best bid or offer, across all 
exchanges.  For each firm and half hour interval, we use the median number of quote updates to separate firms into low and 
high update groups (within each size quintile).  For each firm and subsequent half hour interval, we calculate variance ratios 
based on 15 second and 5 minute quote (NBBO) midpoints.  The table shows time series averages of these group variance 
ratios.  The time series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation is in parentheses. 
Quintile 
Upd. 
Group 
10:00-
10:30 
10:30-
11:00 
11:00-
11:30 
11:30-
12:00 
12:00-
12:30 
12:30-
1:00 
1:00-
1:30 
1:30-
2:00 
2:00-
2:30 
2:30-
3:00 
3:00-
3:30 
3:30-
4:00 
Small Low 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.79 
  (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
 High 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.84 
  (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.56) 
2 Low 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.91 
  (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.58) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) 
 High 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.88 
  (0.60) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (0.60) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) 
3 Low 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.92 
  (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.58) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) 
 High 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.91 
  (0.62) (0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.63) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.53) 
4 Low 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 
  (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69) (0.67) (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) 
 High 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.03 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.62) (0.60) (0.60) (0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.54) 
Large Low 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.09 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.01 
  (0.65) (0.65) (0.67) (0.68) (0.65) (0.64) (0.62) (0.62) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.56) 
 High 1.04 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.02 
  (0.58) (0.59) (0.60) (0.62) (0.60) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) 
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Table 3 
 
Average differences in deviations of variance ratios from one and effective half spreads between low 
and high update groups for size and trade quintiles 
Stocks are first sorted into size quintile based on prior month NYSE breakpoints, and within size 
groups into quintiles based on the number of trades in each half hour.  Within these groups, stocks are 
further sorted into low and high update groups, using the median number of updates.  We calculate the 
deviation in variance ratios from one (|VR-1|) for all securities with a group.  Similarly, we calculate 
share-weighted effective half spreads for all trades in each stock and half hour.  For both variance ratios 
and effective spreads, we calculate the difference in the cross-sectional average of the low and high 
update groups (high minus low).  The table shows the time series average of these cross-sectional 
differences.  The variance ratios in Panel A are based on midpoints at 15 second and 5 minute intervals.  
The variance ratios in Panel B are for stocks in size quintile 5 only and are based on midpoints at 100 
milliseconds and 1 second, as well as 100 milliseconds and 2 sections.  Differences in effective spreads 
are in basis points.  The sample period is 2009-2011.  Standard errors appear in parentheses and are 
based on the time-series of the cross-sectional averages.  
 Quintiles Formed on Number of Trades in Prior Half Hour 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Panel A: Differences in average variance ratios (15 seconds, 5 minutes) 
Small -0.033 -0.028 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2 -0.018 -0.012 -0.019 -0.020 -0.026 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
3 -0.017 -0.020 -0.022 -0.030 -0.035 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
4 -0.022 -0.028 -0.033 -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large -0.027 -0.031 -0.032 -0.031 -0.034 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel B: Differences in average variance ratios (size quintile 5 only) 
100ms, 1sec. 0.0005 -0.0066 -0.0036 -0.0051 0.0064 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
100ms, 2sec. 0.0019 -0.0117 -0.0081 -0.0100 0.0007 
 (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Panel C: Differences in effective spreads (basis points) 
Small -6.10 -0.70 -3.68 -4.23 -1.58 
 (5.81) (0.25) (0.19) (0.07) (0.08) 
2 -1.27 -0.96 -0.77 -0.66 -0.62 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
3 -2.00 -0.12 -0.06 -0.31 -0.58 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
4 -1.27 -0.15 -0.22 -0.91 -1.20 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Large -0.61 -0.28 -0.46 -1.13 -1.12 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
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Table 4 
 
Average differences in effective half-spreads, realized spreads and price impact between low and high 
update groups for size and trade quintiles 
Effective spreads are calculated as the scaled difference between the transaction price and prevailing 
quote mid-point.  Realized spreads are computed as the price movement from transaction prices to a 
future quote midpoint, scaled by the midpoint prevailing at the time of the transaction.  We use quote 
midpoints 1, 5, 10 and 20 seconds after the trade.  Price impact is the difference between the effective 
spread of the transaction and its realized spread.  For each stock, we calculate share-weighted average 
effective spreads, realized spreads and price impact.  We compute cross-sectional averages for stocks in 
each size quintile, trade quintile and update group.  We then calculate the differences between these 
cross-sectional averages between low and high update groups (high minus low).  The table shows the 
time series averages of these differences for each size and trade quintile.  All estimates are in basis 
points.  The sample consists of all stocks in these groups for two randomly selected trading days in each 
month for 2010-2011. 
Size 
Quintile 
Trade 
Quintile Eff. Spreads  Realized Spreads  Price Impact 
    t+1 t+5 t+10 t+20  t+1 t+5 t+10 t+20 
Small 1 -36.7  -14.0 -14.6 -14.2 -13.8  -22.7 -22.1 -22.5 -22.9 
 2 -11.5  -4.9 -5.5 -5.4 -5.3  -6.6 -6.0 -6.1 -6.2 
 3 -7.2  -5.3 -5.4 -5.2 -5.0  -1.9 -1.8 -2.0 -2.2 
 4 -7.5  -5.5 -5.3 -5.1 -4.8  -2.0 -2.2 -2.4 -2.7 
 5 -4.7  -3.7 -3.7 -3.6 -3.4  -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 
             
2 1 -4.3  -2.4 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5  -1.9 -1.6 -1.7 -1.8 
 2 -1.0  -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
 3 -1.1  -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8  -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
 4 -1.0  -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
 5 -0.7  -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7  -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
             
3 1 -2.7  -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5  -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 
 2 -0.4  -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 3 -0.4  -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 4 -0.3  -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 5 -0.4  -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5  0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
             
4 1 -0.7  -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4  -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
 2 -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 3 0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 4 -0.1  -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 5 -0.3  -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4  0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
             
Large 1 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 2 0.1  0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 3 -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 4 -0.2  -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
 5 -0.2  -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
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Table 5 
 
Average variance ratios and effective half spreads before and after large liquidity drawdowns 
The sample consists of all collapsed buyer- and seller-initiated liquidity sweeps in which more than 
10,000 shares are traded. We calculate variance ratios and share-weighted effective spreads 300 seconds 
before the beginning of the aggregated sweep and 300 seconds after the end of the sweep.  We also 
calculate the sum of effective spreads for all trades within the sweep.  Panel A reports the absolute value 
of the distance of the variance ratios from one, as well as the difference between the post- and pre-sweep 
variance ratios.  Panel B reports simple averages of share-weighted pre- and post-sweep effective spreads, 
the intra-sweep effective spread, and the difference between the post- and pre-sweep effective spreads.  
All effective spreads are in basis points. 
Panel A: |VR-1| before and after liquidity sweeps greater than 10,000 shares 
 Pre-Sweep Post-Sweep ∆|VR-1| t-statistic  
Buyer-Initiated      
Small 0.3133 0.3038 -0.0095 -2.88  
2 0.3046 0.2948 -0.0097 -5.33  
3 0.2991 0.2919 -0.0072 -5.11  
4 0.3013 0.2946 -0.0066 -6.37  
Large 0.2696 0.2648 -0.0047 -14.90  
      
Seller-Initiated      
Small 0.3114 0.3085 -0.0028 -0.85  
2 0.3034 0.2930 -0.0103 -5.86  
3 0.2953 0.2899 -0.0054 -3.84  
4 0.2950 0.2919 -0.0030 -2.99  
Large 0.2681 0.2642 -0.0039 -12.38  
Panel B: Average effective half-spreads around liquidity sweeps greater than 10,000 shares 
 Pre-Sweep Intra- Sweep Post- Sweep ∆ Effec. Spread t-statistic 
Buyer-Initiated      
Small 20.10 121.59 17.80 -2.29 -3.41 
2 10.16 65.30 9.30 -0.80 -8.05 
3 7.61 49.73 6.93 -0.68 -8.21 
4 6.08 34.26 5.24 -0.83 -7.38 
Large 3.04 17.18 2.68 -0.36 -9.68 
Seller-Initiated      
Small 19.59 115.22 17.77 -1.85 -3.48 
2 10.35 65.73 9.41 -0.93 -7.74 
3 7.77 48.08 6.98 -0.71 -5.84 
4 6.29 33.61 5.27 -1.02 -5.13 
Large 3.08 17.37 2.70 -0.38 -14.18 
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Table 6 
 
Vector autoregression of daily changes in quote updates, Vix and market quality measures 
We estimate reduced form vector autoregressions with daily data of the form: 
      ∑          
 
   
∑          ∑       
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The number of updates and two measures of market quality (effective spreads and (∆|VR-1|) are averaged across firms in a quintile.  Z-statistics appear in parentheses. 
Panel A: Market quality (MQ) measured as ∆|VR-1| 
 Small  Size Quintile 2  Size Quintile 3  Size Quintile 4  Size Quintile 5 
 ∆Updt ∆MQt ∆VIXt  ∆Updt ∆MQt ∆VIXt  ∆Updt ∆MQt ∆VIXt  ∆Updt ∆MQt ∆VIXt  ∆Updt ∆MQt ∆VIXt 
∆Updt-1 -0.500 
(12.64) 
-0.001 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
 -0.493 
(12.14) 
-0.017 
(1.89) 
0.008 
(0.49) 
 -0.483 
(11.76) 
-0.023 
(1.88) 
0.012 
(0.70) 
 -0.470 
(11.22) 
-0.017 
(1.25) 
0.011 
(0.66) 
 -0.454 
(10.75) 
-0.032 
(2.11) 
0.013 
(0.80) 
∆Updt-2 -0.263 
(6.07) 
-0.012 
(2.11) 
0.018 
(0.89) 
 -0.303 
(6.83) 
-0.019 
(1.90) 
0.010 
(0.57) 
 -0.296 
(6.62) 
-0.022 
(1.61) 
0.015 
(0.84) 
 -0.300 
(6.57) 
-0.016 
(1.05) 
0.008 
(0.44) 
 -0.292 
(6.37) 
-0.026 
(1.56) 
0.008 
(0.47) 
∆Updt-3 -0.206 
(4.74) 
-0.006 
(1.06) 
0.014 
(0.72) 
 -0.241 
(5.41) 
-0.09 
(0.88) 
-0.002 
(0.14) 
 -0.248 
(5.55) 
-0.017 
(1.29) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
 -0.222 
(4.85) 
-0.006 
(0.44) 
-0.005 
(0.27) 
 -0.206 
(4.48) 
-0.017 
(1.05) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
∆Updt-4 -0.025 
(0.63) 
-0.007 
(1.31) 
0.031 
(1.66) 
 -0.065 
(1.60) 
-0.016 
(1.76) 
0.021 
(1.22) 
 -0.068 
(1.66) 
-0.032 
(2.57) 
0.028 
(1.68) 
 -0.067 
(1.61) 
-0.013 
(0.95) 
0.019 
(1.17) 
 -0.072 
(1.71) 
-0.013 
(0.91) 
0.022 
(1.34) 
∆VIXt-1 0.428 
(5.14) 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.102 
(2.58) 
 0.515 
(5.52) 
-0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.110 
(2.71) 
 0.548 
(5.62) 
0.007 
(0.26) 
-0.109 
(2.68) 
 0.603 
(5.81) 
-0.019 
(0.56) 
-0.109 
(2.62) 
 0.593 
(5.73) 
-0.014 
(0.39) 
-0.112 
(2.72) 
∆VIXt-2 0.113 
(1.34) 
0.011 
(0.99) 
-0.074 
(1.83) 
 0.175 
(1.82) 
0.025 
(1.15) 
-0.076 
(1.82) 
 0.214 
(2.13) 
0.017 
(0.57) 
-0.08 
(2.05) 
 0.236 
(2.20) 
-0.009 
(0.26) 
-0.082 
(1.94) 
 0.206 
(1.93) 
0.011 
(0.30) 
-0.082 
(1.92) 
∆VIXt-3 0.031 
(0.37) 
-0.018 
(1.60) 
-0.115 
(2.85) 
 0.151 
(1.58) 
-0.002 
(0.11) 
-0.098 
(2.36) 
 0.203 
(2.04) 
-0.003 
(0.12) 
-0.099 
(2.39) 
 0.198 
(1.87) 
-0.299 
(0.83) 
-0.093 
(2.21) 
 0.177 
(1.67) 
-0.022 
(0.57) 
-0.101 
(2.39) 
∆VIXt-4 -0.032 
(0.39) 
0.023 
(2.05) 
-0.055 
(1.39) 
 0.029 
(0.32) 
0.026 
(1.21) 
-0.051 
(1.26) 
 0.069 
(0.71) 
0.046 
(1.53) 
-0.063 
(1.54) 
 0.066 
(0.64) 
0.011 
(0.32) 
-0.059 
(1.44) 
 0.071 
(0.69) 
0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.064 
(1.57) 
∆MQt-1 0.036 
(0.13) 
-0.650 
(17.90) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 0.131 
(0.83) 
-0.675 
(18.39) 
-0.017 
(0.26) 
 0.197 
(1.66) 
-0.622 
(16.95) 
0.007 
(0.16) 
 0.285 
(2.58) 
-0.630 
(16.88) 
0.010 
(0.24) 
 0.289 
(2.82) 
-0.688 
(18.40) 
0.004 
(0.12) 
∆MQt-2 0.183 
(0.59) 
-0.521 
(12.48) 
0.021 
(0.15) 
 0.175 
(0.93) 
-0.449 
(10.34) 
-0.054 
(0.67) 
 0.182 
(1.32) 
-0.388 
(9.11) 
-0.055 
(0.96) 
 0.197 
(1.55) 
-0.410 
(9.50) 
-0.067 
(1.33) 
 0.240 
(1.97) 
-0.486 
(10.96) 
-0.053 
(1.09) 
∆MQt-3 0.175 
(0.57) 
-0.336 
(8.08) 
-0.071 
(0.49) 
 0.302 
(1.61) 
-0.262 
(6.04) 
-0.046 
(0.58) 
 0.219 
(1.58) 
-0.206 
(4.83) 
-0.021 
(0.37) 
 0.210 
(1.64) 
-0.236 
(5.44) 
-0.036 
(0.72) 
 0.275 
(2.26) 
-0.251 
(5.66) 
-0.035 
(0.72) 
∆MQt-4 0.014 
(0.05) 
-0.179 
(4.98) 
-0.048 
(0.38) 
 0.241 
(1.52) 
-0.128 
(3.50) 
-0.04 
(0.68) 
 0.130 
(1.08) 
-0.120 
(3.27) 
-0.052 
(1.05) 
 0.033 
(0.30) 
-0.119 
(3.17) 
-0.073 
(1.66) 
 0.006 
(0.06) 
-0.111 
(2.96) 
-0.081 
(1.98) 
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Panel B: Market quality (MQ) measured as change in effective spreads| 
                    
∆Updt-1 -0.500 
(12.65) 
-0.032 
(0.75) 
0.004 
(0.26) 
 -0.491 
(12.12) 
-0.050 
(0.72) 
0.013 
(0.75) 
 -0.490 
(11.87) 
-0.083 
(1.21) 
0.017 
(1.03) 
 -0.498 
(11.95) 
-0.075 
(1.17) 
0.011 
(0.70) 
 -0.489 
(11.66) 
-0.054 
(1.03) 
0.010 
(0.65) 
∆Updt-2 -0.264 
(6.11) 
0.034 
(0.71) 
0.018 
(0.91) 
 -0.307 
(6.96) 
0.055 
(0.72) 
0.012 
(0.67) 
 -0.306 
(6.83) 
0.074 
(0.99) 
0.017 
(0.93) 
 -0.317 
(6.94) 
0.023 
(0.34) 
0.011 
(0.63) 
 -0.321 
(7.02) 
-0.028 
(0.49) 
0.009 
(0.53) 
∆Updt-3 -0.204 
(4.72) 
-0.020 
(0.42) 
0.019 
(0.96) 
 -0.245 
(5.53) 
-0.084 
(1.10) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
 -0.252 
(5.61) 
-0.087 
(1.16) 
0.009 
(0.49) 
 -0.238 
(5.22) 
-0.091 
(1.29) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
 -0.248 
(5.41) 
-0.062 
(1.08) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
∆Updt-4 -0.026 
(0.67) 
-0.068 
(1.56) 
0.032 
(1.71) 
 -0.074 
(1.82) 
-0.082 
(1.17) 
0.022 
(1.30) 
 -0.078 
(1.91) 
-0.101 
(1.47) 
0.030 
(1.77) 
 -0.075 
(1.82) 
-0.073 
(1.14) 
0.023 
(1.44) 
 -0.085 
(2.06) 
-0.061 
(1.16) 
0.026 
(1.60) 
∆VIXt-1 0.448 
(5.00) 
0.259 
(2.62) 
-0.049 
(1.16) 
 0.534 
(5.36) 
0.334 
(1.94) 
-0.058 
(1.36) 
 0.545 
(5.28) 
0.412 
(2.38) 
-0.062 
(1.45) 
 0.559 
(5.09) 
0.421 
(2.49) 
-0.061 
(1.42) 
 0.521 
(4.74) 
0.361 
(2.60) 
-0.064 
(1.49) 
∆VIXt-2 0.074 
(0.81) 
0.159 
(1.58) 
-0.073 
(1.46) 
 0.131 
(1.29) 
0.280 
(1.59) 
-0.075 
(1.72) 
 0.159 
(1.51) 
0.346 
(1.96) 
-0.085 
(1.94) 
 0.170 
(1.52) 
0.384 
(2.22) 
-0.079 
(1.80) 
 0.169 
(1.52) 
0.436 
(3.08) 
-0.072 
(1.63) 
∆VIXt-3 0.056 
(0.61) 
-0.023 
(0.23) 
-0.080 
(1.84) 
 0.178 
(1.75) 
0.024 
(0.14) 
-0.069 
(1.58) 
 0.232 
(2.21) 
0.061 
(0.36) 
-0.074 
(1.70) 
 0.208 
(1.86) 
0.100 
(0.58) 
-0.068 
(1.55) 
 0.159 
(1.43) 
0.123 
(0.87) 
-0.072 
(1.64) 
∆VIXt-4 -0.033 
(0.04) 
0.266 
(2.67) 
-0.047 
(1.11) 
 0.048 
(0.49) 
0.427 
(2.49) 
-0.050 
(1.18) 
 0.075 
(0.73) 
0.451 
(2.62) 
-0.060 
(1.64) 
 0.058 
(0.53) 
0.383 
(2.28) 
-0.054 
(1.22) 
 0.018 
(0.17) 
0.255 
(1.86) 
-0.068 
(1.59) 
∆MQt-1 -0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.257 
(6.43) 
-0.054 
(3.18) 
 -0.015 
(0.68) 
-0.178 
(4.48) 
-0.032 
(3.21) 
 0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.198 
(4.98) 
-0.032 
(3.24) 
 0.034 
(1.36) 
-0.233 
(5.58) 
-0.031 
(3.06) 
 0.070 
(2.27) 
-0.349 
(8.92) 
-0.037 
(3.08) 
∆MQt-2 0.025 
(0.69) 
-0.076 
(1.87) 
-0.005 
(0.33) 
 0.016 
(0.71) 
-0.055 
(1.37) 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
 0.026 
(1.10) 
-0.081 
(2.00) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
 0.041 
(1.55) 
-0.083 
(2.05) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
 0.050 
(1.53) 
-0.146 
(3.51) 
-0.002 
(0.23) 
∆MQt-3 -0.035 
(0.96) 
-0.036 
(0.89) 
-0.028 
(1.62) 
 -0.026 
(1.13) 
-0.011 
(0.29) 
-0.014 
(1.14) 
 -0.028 
(1.16) 
-0.009 
(0.24) 
0.014 
(1.45) 
 -0.020 
(0.77) 
-0.014 
(0.36) 
-0.014 
(1.42) 
 0.028 
(0.86) 
-0.004 
(0.12) 
-0.010 
(0.83) 
∆MQt-4 -0.027 
(0.75) 
-0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.007 
(0.44) 
 -0.014 
(0.63) 
0.021 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
 -0.006 
(0.27) 
-0.018 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
 0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.021 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
 0.043 
(1.38) 
-0.049 
(1.25) 
0.010 
(0.85) 
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Table 7 
 
Average paired differences in deviations of variance ratios from one, effective spreads, realized spread 
and price impact around the introduction of arrowhead on the tokyo stock exchange 
The sample consist of the 229 largest stocks on the 1st Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange that did not 
experience changes in tick size in the three month period before and after the introduction of arrowhead.  
We calculate variance ratios over half hour intervals based on 15-second and 5 minute returns, and 
compute the absolute deviation from one (|VR-1|).  For each stock, we average these deviations in each 
half hour interval in the three months before and after the introduction of arrowhead, and compute a 
paired difference.  The column labeled |VR-1|post - |VR-1|pre shows average paired differences.  We 
compute share-weighted effective, realized spreads (using quote midpoints 10 seconds after the trade), 
and price impact in each stock-day and half hour interval.  We average these in the three months before 
and after the introduction of arrowhead, and reported a paired difference (after minus before) in basis 
points.  T-statistics appear in parentheses. 
     
 |VR-1|post - |VR-1|pre ∆ Effective Spread ∆ Realized Spread ∆ Price Impact 
9:00 - 9:30 -0.016 
(1.80) 
-1.16 
(11.12) 
-8.89 
(45.93) 
7.73 
(39.32) 
9:30 - 10:00  -0.037  
(3.18) 
-1.00 
(8.87) 
-7.81 
(39.20) 
6.80 
(35.13) 
10:00 - 10:30 -0.020 
(1.97) 
-1.01 
(7.95) 
-6.90 
(40.36) 
5.92 
(37.58) 
10:30 - 11:00  -0.015 
(1.02) 
-0.90 
(7.52) 
-6.40 
(36.35) 
5.50 
(36.52) 
12:30 - 1:00 -0.019 
(1.85) 
-2.69 
(22.68) 
-6.88 
(42.16) 
4.19 
(22.92) 
1:00 - 1:30 -0.025 
(2.25) 
-0.90 
(7.38) 
-6.18 
(37.26) 
5.29 
(36.04) 
1:30 - 2:00 -0.019 
(1.13) 
-0.89 
(7.25) 
-5.94 
(38.86) 
5.04 
(34.29) 
2:00 - 2:30 -0.027 
(1.97) 
-0.88 
(7.18) 
-5.95 
(39.41) 
5.06 
(37.32) 
2:30 - 3:00 -0.026 
(1.54) 
-1.00 
(7.56) 
-5.07 
(37.06) 
4.14 
(39.33) 
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Figure 1: Stocks are sorted into size quintile based on prior month NYSE breakpoints, and within size 
groups into quintiles based on the number of trades in each half hour.  For example, Size1Trade1 contains 
firms in the smallest size and trade quintile.  Within these 25 (5x5) groups, stocks are further sorted into low 
and high update groups, using the median number of updates.  We calculate average variance ratios for all 
stocks within a group and plot the time series average of these cross-sectional means.   
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Figure 2: Stocks are sorted into size quintile based on prior month NYSE breakpoints, and within size 
groups into quintiles based on the number of trades in each half hour.  For example, Size1Trade1 contains 
firms in the smallest size and trade quintile.  Within these 25 (5x5) groups, stocks are further sorted into low 
and high update groups, using the median number of updates.  We calculate the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of variance ratios for all stocks within a group and plot the time series average of these cross -
sectional standard deviations. 
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Figure 3: Stocks are sorted into size quintile based on prior month NYSE breakpoints, and within size 
groups into quintiles based on the number of trades in each half hour.  For example, Size1Trade1 contains 
firms in the smallest size and trade quintile.  Within these 25 (5x5) groups, stocks are further sorted into low 
and high update groups, using the median number of updates.  We calculate share-weighted effective half-
spreads for all stocks within a group and plot the time series average of these cross -sectional means. 
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Figure 4: An illustration of collapsing consecutive sweeps.  In this illustration, the time line is in seconds 
and the median time between trades in the prior month and the same half our interval is 1 second.  
Consecutive sweeps that take place with an inter-sweep time of 1 second are collapsed together. 
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Figure 5: Each day, we sum the number of updates for each firm and then average across firms in size 
quintiles.  Daily closing values of the VIX index are plotted using the right vertical axis.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
1
/2
/2
0
0
9
2
/2
/2
0
0
9
3
/2
/2
0
0
9
4
/2
/2
0
0
9
5
/2
/2
0
0
9
6
/2
/2
0
0
9
7
/2
/2
0
0
9
8
/2
/2
0
0
9
9
/2
/2
0
0
9
1
0
/2
/2
0
0
9
1
1
/2
/2
0
0
9
1
2
/2
/2
0
0
9
1
/2
/2
0
1
0
2
/2
/2
0
1
0
3
/2
/2
0
1
0
4
/2
/2
0
1
0
5
/2
/2
0
1
0
6
/2
/2
0
1
0
7
/2
/2
0
1
0
8
/2
/2
0
1
0
9
/2
/2
0
1
0
1
0
/2
/2
0
1
0
1
1
/2
/2
0
1
0
1
2
/2
/2
0
1
0
1
/2
/2
0
1
1
2
/2
/2
0
1
1
3
/2
/2
0
1
1
4
/2
/2
0
1
1
5
/2
/2
0
1
1
6
/2
/2
0
1
1
7
/2
/2
0
1
1
8
/2
/2
0
1
1
9
/2
/2
0
1
1
1
0
/2
/2
0
1
1
1
1
/2
/2
0
1
1
1
2
/2
/2
0
1
1
V
IX
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
U
p
d
a
te
s
Small 2 3 4 Large VIX
 46 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The figure shows the cross-sectional average of the number of updates, cancellations, trades, 
modifications that lose time priority, modifications that keep time priority and submissions between July 1, 
2009 and March 31, 2011.  The sample consists of the largest 300 stocks in the first section of the TSE at the 
beginning of each month. 
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Figure 7: For each stock that does not experience a tick size change in the three months before and after the 
arrowhead introduction, we calculate the share-weighted average effective spread, realized spreads and price 
impact for each day.  Realized spreads and price impact are based on quote midpoints 10 seconds after a 
trade.  The figure shows the cross-sectional average on each day from October 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010. 
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